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In the February issue, Wade Huntley addressed the familiar topic of the proper role of nuclear 
weapons in America's nuclear force structure.[1] Rehashing the decades-old conflict over 
whether nuclear weapons require a war-fighting foundation to be effective deterrents or whether 
they deter through the simple fact of being, Huntley provides a modern version of the existential 
deterrent argument. Working from the assumption that deterrence was successful during the Cold 
War, he questions taking any action with respect to the U.S. nuclear force structure with the 
singular exception of reduction.[2] For existentialists, diversifying the nuclear arsenal to include 
creating "new low-yield, earth-penetrating, and damage-limiting nuclear weapons suitable for 
tactical, first strike missions" is unacceptable precisely because it means endowing nuclear 
weapons with war-fighting purpose. By assigning such purpose to nuclear weapons, the 
argument goes, the firebreak between conventional weaponry and nuclear arms is diminished 
and decision-makers may be more apt to actually use nuclear weapons. Accordingly, for 
adherents of this school of thought, nuclear weaponry must be limited to massive doomsday 
devices with no use besides deterring wholesale strategic nuclear exchanges. This argument is 
fatally flawed in that it misunderstands the nature of deterrence as a scientific rather than a 
psychological phenomenon. In the current security environment, American policymakers must 
repeal the intentional retarding of the American nuclear force and enhance deterrent credibility by 
planning for tactical nuclear use. 
The Fallacy of Existential Deterrence 
Huntley argues that whereas the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons was supposedly 
justified during the Cold War under the logic that they might be used to provide escalation 
dominance so as to prevent the emergence of strategic nuclear exchange, no such justification 
exists today. In Huntley's words, "Weinberger's arguments on U.S. nuclear policies were focused 
on the Soviet nuclear threat, which evaporated with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of 
the Soviet Union." This statement suggests a fundamental flaw in the argument. If nuclear 
weapons threaten, and impliedly deter, simply through existence, then the fact that Russia 
maintains a large nuclear arsenal, including on-going production of new SS-27 Topol-M ICBMs 
and a large tactical nuclear inventory marked by uncertainty, means that the threat has hardly 
"evaporated." Their mere existence must constitute a threat. Conversely, if the "threat" is based 
on intentions rather than simple existence of nuclear weapons, than deterrence must be likewise 
qualified to consider intentions. Accordingly, there must be some credible intent to use nuclear 
weapons under certain circumstances if they are to be effective deterrents. To be credible, logic 
demands there be some identifiable purpose behind this use. As an indiscriminate city-busting 
targeting doctrine hardly seems credible in deterring the types of activities the United States 
seeks to deter in the current environment, a counter-force application would seem appropriate. 
Thus, to meaningfully and effectively deter, nuclear weapons require some counter-force (war-
fighting) purpose reflected in their design. 
A response to the argument above might hold that instead of reshaping our nuclear forces to 
provide credibility, we might instead rely on conventional superiority for all deterrence missions as 
no taboo surrounds conventional weapons. A conventional response would thus have greater 
credibility and provide a superior deterrent. The trouble with this policy is that nuclear weapons 
are often perceived to have capabilities far in excess of conventional weapons. With the 
advances brought about through precision guided munitions, laser targeting, and deep 
penetration primaries, this perceived gap may in truth be quite small for many purposes. 
However, because deterrence is a psychological event, perception is more important than fact. If 
a tyrant believes that nuclear weapons are superior, than for the purposes of deterrence, they 
are. 
Moreover, with the global reordering following the collapse of the Soviet Union, attempting to 
drawn analogies from the Cold War to the present context for purposes of justifying force 
structure is inherently flawed. Huntley admits this only after attempting to exploit Weinberger's 
statements in a comparative manner. He then describes the Nuclear Posture Review's outlined 
shift in force structure, which includes a major reduction in deployed strategic warheads and the 
possible development of much smaller yield tactical warheads, as requiring "an unprecedented 
offensive expansion of U.S. nuclear policy." While the Bush administration directly and honestly 
admits that preemption is an option, characterizing this as an unprecedented offensive expansion 
is erroneous. As is stated in the National Security Strategy, this is not a shift or a new policy. 
Indeed, the U.S. refusal to adopt a no-first-use policy was a major underpinning of the credibility 
of NATO throughout the Cold War. For nearly four decades, diverse tactical nuclear weapons 
were a part of the deployed American arsenal. If new generation tactical nuclear weapons can 
cause rogue states or transnational actors to think twice about the advisability of investing major 
resources into a weapons program that might be rendered ineffective or eradicated in full by well 
placed tactical nuclear strikes, then they are reprising the role of providing strategic security 
played by their larger cousins during the Cold War. 
Ultimately, deterrence should never be the concluding chapter of national security strategy. As 
long as it seems to work, then including deterrence as a prominent aspect of defense planning is 
prudent; however, should deterrence fail, we must not be caught unprepared. Indeed, even if 
planning for deterrence's failure were to diminish the likelihood of deterrence's success, we might 
reasonably consider the risks sufficiently grave to nonetheless partake in such planning. 
Fortunately, this is not the case, as the very act of planning and structuring forces for post-
deterrence use enhances the credibility of deterrence. Thus, planning for nuclear use works 
synergistically with ensuring the most credible deterrent possible. Accordingly, alarmism over 
reducing the gap between nuclear and conventional weaponry fails to appreciate that the 
reduction enhances deterrence and thus diminishes the probability of actually having to use either 
tool. 
Internationalism is a Means, Not an End 
Huntley warns that Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) commitments and related assurances 
might be broken should the United States use tactical nuclear weapons in a preemptive strike to 
eliminate an adversary's chemical, biological or radiological weapons program. In this respect, 
Huntley is unquestionably correct. Should this in fact come to pass, then so be it. The NPT is a 
Cold War treaty that has failed to prevent states desiring nuclear weapons from pursuing them. 
Israel, India, and Pakistan never bothered to join. North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya all pursued 
nuclear weapons programs despite NPT promises. The NPT's verification and enforcement 
regime has been questionable at best, as evidenced by the surprising scope of the now public 
Libyan program, the inability to detect North Korea's highly enriched uranium (HEU) weapons 
program, and the blatant Iranian violations with respect to uranium enrichment programs. 
Coupled with the divestiture of chemical and biological weapons capability, these assurances 
leave the United States wholly reliant on conventional deterrence to forestall a non-nuclear 
power's use of CBW. Developing new tactical nuclear weapons and providing them with a role in 
American military doctrine would enhance deterrence compared to stubborn adherence to the 
NPT.  
Rather than constraining American security options due to concerns over violating an ineffectual 
treaty left over from a different security environment, emphasis should be placed on counter-
proliferation efforts such as export control regimes and the Proliferation Security Initiative. Such 
programs trade diplomatic rhetoric for practical effective measures. Notwithstanding the 
traditional citation of international norms or treaty commitments, the reason that more states do 
not have nuclear weapons is the difficulty of obtaining fissile material in sufficient quantities. In 
that ensuring compliance with NPT promises requires a united international front, and given the 
resentment over American hegemony that has led to reluctance on the part of some to cooperate 
with American-led multilateral initiatives, we lack the ability to prevent proliferation within the 
confines of the NPT.  
In the same vein, Huntley asserts that preemption is contrary to a common interpretation of 
Article 51 of the UN Charter.[3] Again, this is undeniably so. Of course, others would hold that in 
the era of weapons of mass destruction preemption is an increasingly important means of self-
defense. As such, the distinction between preventive war and preemptive war has become quite 
blurred. Characterizing preemption as dependent on the "imminence" of the threat merely shifts 
the semantic debate rather than answering it. Given the lack of reaction time and the gravity of 
potential harm, the concept of self-defense is rendered empty if imminence is held to mean 
missiles are on the launch-pad. Thus, is actual possession of a nuclear weapon sufficient to 
qualify as "imminent," or is pursuit of a nuclear weapons program via HEU activities enough? The 
clear answer is that objective capabilities and force posture alone cannot reasonably define 
"imminent." Instead the more subjective analysis of intention must accompany and inform an 
assessment of objective capabilities if we are to derive meaning from imminent. Establishing 
universal criteria to establish the imminence of a threat is no more possible than establishing 
objective criteria for determining a case of individual assault.[4] 
Huntley offers a six factor approach provided by Brad Roberts as a potential set of objective 
criteria for preemption, consisting of  
1. the target state has threatened use of NBC weapons against the United States;  
2. such weapons were acquired in violation of international law;  
3. there is a concern regarding "broader U.S. regional security guarantees and/or power 
stability;"  
4. the President obtains Congressional approval;  
5. the United States obtains UN Security Council approval and approval of "any relevant 
regional organization;" and  
6. the preemptive attack is a last resort, proportional, and has a reasonable chance of 
success.[5]  
The inherent difficulty of such an approach is obvious. With respect to condition one, what 
constitutes a "threat?" Is the Chinese General Xiong Guangkai's question regarding the will of the 
United States to trade Los Angeles for Taiwan a threat?[6] Are North Korea's state broadcasts 
slandering the United States and threatening dire consequences sufficient to constitute a threat? 
As to condition two, why would this be relevant? Iran could withdraw from the NPT pursuant to 
Article X and no longer be bound within three months.[7] If it then purchased nuclear weapons 
from Pakistan, another non-party to the NPT, what difference would it make that these weapons 
were "legally" acquired if the United States perceived hostile Iranian intentions? Moreover, 
defining what is legal under international law is an exercise of sovereign subjectivity in most 
cases of consequence in the first place. The subjectivity of the third condition is patent and no 
more universal than the Bush administration's approach assailed by Huntley. Expecting states to 
agree on such "concern" is unsound. This problem is magnified in condition five, requiring UN 
Security Council approval. Rarely will the respective self-perceived spheres of influence of 
permanent Security Council members not be in conflict so as to permit consensus approval of 
preemptive strikes. However, under this approach, not only is Security Council approval required, 
but also that of "any relevant regional organization." As such approval would often lead to 
increasing the threat to small local powers, reticence to provide approval should be expected. In 
sum, this proposal is unworkable in that it stands to eliminate any possibility of actually 
implementing preemption. Of course, this may well be the intent. 
International regimes and institutions are not ends in themselves. Rather, American participation 
in and recognition of such entities is a means of ensuring security. When these means no longer 
succeed, U.S. policy-makers must reassess the value of continued participation. Subordinating 
U.S. security concerns to continued good standing in international organizations and to the 
approval of global opinion is an abdication of sovereign responsibility. While multilateral support is 
obviously desirable, if such fails to materialize when necessary, as has been the case in the post 
Cold War era more often than not, American leaders must retain the option of unilateral action. 
Huntley argues that the Bush doctrine "if adopted by all countries" would result in a situation in 
which "states would be restrained in action only by considerations of relative power." That this is 
the essence of the most influential theory of international relations historically and a descriptively 
accurate portrait of what is occurring irrespective of the Bush doctrine is obvious. 
Preemption of Rogues and Terrorists 
Huntley argues that rogue states have by and large been quite rational, seeking only to deter a 
U.S. attack upon themselves. If in fact such leaders are rational, then the obvious strategy for 
such leaders would be to forego WMD programs, as has Libya, so as to avoid any pretense for 
an American "imperialist" attack. Yet, while rogue states undoubtedly seek to avoid attacks on 
themselves, they also seek to further the agenda that earned them the title "rogue" in the first 
place. Regimes such as those in North Korea and Iran clearly place priority on pursuing an 
aggressive agenda counter to American interests. Should the United States adopt a neo-
isolationist posture, we might avoid North Korean or Iranian attacks in the near term. 
Unfortunately, we would also see our position in the world, as well as that of our friends and 
allies, deteriorate. In the globalized economy of the high-tech twenty-first century, isolationism is 
unacceptable. American must remain engaged in the world and protect our interests globally.  
Distinguishing between terrorists and rogue states is proper, and as Huntley points out, deterring 
non-state terrorists may be significantly more difficult. Yet simply because it may be more difficult 
does not mean it will be impossible, nor does it mean that we should abandon attempts to do so. 
Terrorists who desire WMD will typically need a base for training, production, support, planning, 
and accessing funds among other things. Holding out the possibility of U.S. preemptive strikes 
may serve as a major disincentive to states that might otherwise permit terrorist organizations to 
set up shop. It is highly unlikely that a transnational group could build the infrastructure to house a 
hardened below-ground NBC facility without the knowledge of the host state. By making clear the 
American will to deny transnational terrorists groups access to NBC weapons, states may choose 
to avoid involvement and deny such groups the safe haven desired.  
One strategy sure to meet with failure is that commonly advanced of "dealing with the root cause 
of terrorism." Typically, root-cause advocates suggest placing the grievances of terrorists high on 
the international agenda and working to a negotiated solution in the form of compromise. Often 
this involves reference to an unjust global economy and platitudes regarding eliminating poverty 
and ensuring a more equal distribution of wealth. However noble, ending world poverty is a goal 
beyond the means of the United States. Moreover, adopting this root-cause strategy will result in 
the proliferation of terrorism just as paying ransom results in spurring new kidnappings. 
Numerous groups are victims of injustice across the world, yet most do not turn to terrorism. If we 
elevate the grievances of terrorists to higher priority items, we signal these other groups that the 
path to resolving injustice is through terrorism. National security and moral leadership in the war 
against terrorism would be diminished by such policies far more than through creation of 
resentment via preemption.  
Conclusion 
In the end, Huntley argues that updating our nuclear force posture to reflect the changed security 
environment will trap us in the security dilemma where defensive precautions are perceived as 
threats leading to an international arms race and diminished security. Perhaps this may occur 
with some actors; however, the facts clearly demonstrate that there are others who are upgrading 
their own forces regardless of what we do. Official Chinese military budgets have steadily 
increased by ten percent or more for almost fifteen consecutive years.[8] A clandestine North 
Korean nuclear weapons program has been underway despite the Agreed Framework. Iran 
continues to work on acquiring nuclear weapons despite the violations highlighted by IAEA 
inspections. Terrorist organizations seek WMD by whatever means possible. If we are to stand 
pat for fear of provoking others (Russia?) while this parade of despotic regimes and common 
thugs steadily progresses on the path to obtaining or increasing nuclear arsenals, we will have 
failed both our own and future generations in a catastrophic manner. 
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